

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-25

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

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S E C R E T STATE 166472

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FURTHER GUIDANCE ON ISSUES RAISED IN
AUGUST 9 SPC DISCUSSION

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REF: (A) USNATO 3786; (B) STATE 158062; (C) STATE 162345;
(D) STATE 161267

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1. FOLLOWING IS FOR MISSION'S USE IN RESPONDING TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS IN AUGUST 9 SPC DISCUSSION NOT COVERED IN REF (C).

2. BELGIAN VIEW (PARA 4 REF A) IS THAT ALLIES SHOULD PRESS HARD FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION ON NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT TERRITORY, BUT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE ISSUE WITH SOVIETS AT OUTSET IN VIEW OF LIKELIHOOD OF NEGATIVE RESPONSE. THIS IS TACTICAL ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR SECTION III OF PROJECTED ALLIED PAPER. HOWEVER, YOU MAY NOTE THAT, IN OUR THINKING, FRAMEWORK APPROACH TO PRESENTING ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROGRAM WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT WE WILL WISH TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION, WHILE SPECIFICS COULD BE DEALT WITH SUBSEQUENTLY AT SUCH TIME AS ALLIES JUDGE APPROPRIATE. WE AGREE WITH BELGIAN VIEW THAT IT IS TACTICALLY UNDESIRABLE TO TEST SOVIETS ON VERIFICATION AT EARLY STAGE IN NEGOTIATION AND HOPE THAT CONSENSUS WILL FORM ON THIS POINT. (BEGIN FYI: IT MAY BE THAT WILLOT HAS IN MIND TO TRY TO SELL IDEA OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION TO INDIVIDUAL EAST EUROPEANS (E.G., POLES) PRIOR TO PUSHING SUBJECT WITH SOVIETS. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO ENCOURAGE HIS ENTHUSIASM FOR SUCH A STRATEGY. END FYI.)

3. WITH REFERENCE TO BELGIAN INTEREST (PARA 5 REF A) IN OVERALL CEILINGS FOR ALLIED AND WARSAW PACT FORCES WITHIN WHICH ALLIES OTHER THAN US COULD ADJUST INDIVIDUAL FORCE LEVELS DURING SECOND PHASE, WE HAVE INDICATED OUR VIEW (STATE 162345 PARA 6) THAT SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY SEEK SUCH CEILING IN FIRST PHASE AND THAT ALLIES COULD USE SUCH SOVIET INTEREST AS BARGAINING ADVANTAGE. BEYOND THIS, WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT DECISIONS ON ALLIED POSITIONS IN SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DEFERRED.

4. WITH REGARD TO BELGIAN REP'S VIEW (PARA 5 REF A) THAT TAC AIR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM FIRST PHASE, WE COULD NOT AGREE WITH CATEGORICAL VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT AGREE THAT CAUTIOUS TACTICS WILL BE NEEDED.

PARA 3

ABOVE COMMENTS ON BELGIAN CONCERN (PARA 5 REF A) THAT NON-SECRET

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CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS COULD MEAN THAT OTHER ALLIES COULD NOT INCREASE THEIR FORCES IF US REDUCED ITS FORCES.

5. YOU MAY INDICATE THAT US COULD ACCEPT ADDITION TO PART IV OF US JULY 27 PAPER OF HEADING ALONG LINES OF FRG REP'S SUGGESTION (PARA 7 REF A), "PROVISIONS FOR CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN SECOND PHASE."

6. WE ARE NOT PREPARED AS YET TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BY FRG REPS AND OTHERS (E.G., PARA 8 REF A) ON FORCES US ENVISAGES REDUCING IN FIRST PHASE. WE ARE PRESENTLY ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES WITHIN USG.

WE CANNOT AND DO NOT INTEND TO GO BEYOND MISSION'S RESPONSE TO FRG QUESTION (PARA 8B REF A) ON POSSIBLE FURTHER US CUTS IN SECOND PHASE. WE ENDORSE MISSION'S REPLY TO QUESTION (PARA 8D) ON WHY SOVIETS WOULD REJECT ASYMMETRICAL CUTS IN FIRST PHASE BUT ACCEPT THEM IN SECOND PHASE.

7. WITH REFERENCE TO GENERAL UK CONCERN ABOUT SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 9 REF A), WE HOPE OTHER ALLIES, AND ESPECIALLY FRG, WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR A SECOND PHASE. FRG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. MISSION MAY AGAIN NOTE US VIEW THAT A SECOND PHASE IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO MOVE TOWARD A COMMON CEILING AND USEFUL FOR REASONS OF DOMESTIC OPINION IN ALLIED COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FOR NEGOTIATING REASONS AS A POTENTIAL MEANS OF DEALING

WITH ISSUES NOT COVERED IN FIRST PHASE, SUCH AS EUROPEAN ALLIED FORCES.

8. SEE SEPTTEL ON UK VIEW THAT COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE BASIS OF ALLIED PROPOSAL (PARA 9F REF A).

9. RESPONDING TO UK COMMENT (PARA 9I REF A) THAT US ARGUMENTS AGAINST SETTING 10 PERCENT LIMIT ON US GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN FIRST PHASE COULD APPLY EQUALLY AGAINST 15 PERCENT, YOU MAY NOTE THAT, IN FACT, 15 PERCENT US FIGURE IS NOT AN ARBITRARY FIGURE, BUT ONE DETERMINED AS PERCENTAGE EQUIVALENT OF PROPOSED SOVIET GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION CALLED FOR BY WITHDRAWAL OF USSR TANK ARMY.

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10. REF UK SKEPTICISM ON NEGOTIABILITY OF US PROPOSAL (PARA 9J), WE CONTINUE TO THINK WE SHOULD AVOID SPECULATIVE PREDICTION OF COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ACTUAL COURSE OF EVENTS IS ONLY REAL TEST.

11. ON UK RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT MENTION OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS AS PART OF A COMMON CEILING CONCEPT (PARA 9K), WHICH IS OPPOSITE OF BELGIAN INSISTENCE THAT ALLIES TELL SOVIETS LIMITS OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS FROM OUTSET, YOU MAY NOTE THAT USING CONCEPT WITHOUT ILLUSTRATIVE NUMBERS WOULD MAKE IT CONFUSING IN NEGOTIATIONS, MIGHT NOT SERVE TO ELICIT INDICATIVE SOVIET REACTION, AND WOULD AVOID INDICATING RANGE OF REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED ON ALLIED SIDE IN KEEPING WITH BELGIAN CONCERNS. FURTHER, WE

BELIEVE EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION AND DEFENSE OF COMMON
CEILING TO DOMESTIC OPINION AND CONGRESS NOT POSSIBLE
WITHOUT FIGURES. THUS, WE CONTINUE STRONGLY TO BELIEVE
THAT ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURE (I.E., 700,000) IS NECESSARY TO
MAKE THE CONCEPT A VALID WORKING TOOL. THE ISSUE OF
WHEN THIS IS DONE IS A SEPARATE TACTICAL QUESTION WHICH
WE WILL ADDRESS IN A FORTHCOMING MESSAGE.

12. SEPTEL IN PREPARATION ON AUGUST 13 SPC DISCUSSION ON
BASIC CHARACTER OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION.

13. REFERENCE YOUR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CARRINGTON
STANCE (PARA 14, REF A), HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT NATO
STILL DOES NOT HAVE A SOLID POSITION THIS CLOSE TO THE
BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE NATO PROPOSAL
MIGHT BE LOOKED UPON BY THE SOVIETS AS AN OPENING PO-
SITION AND NOT AN OUTCOME. ROGERS

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